The influence of intention and outcome information on moral judgments was investigated by telling children aged 4-8 years and adults (N = 169) stories involving accidental harms (positive intention, negative outcome) or attempted harms (negative intention, positive outcome) from two studies (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). When the original acceptability (wrongness) question was asked, the original findings were closely replicated: children's and adults' acceptability judgments were based almost exclusively on outcome, and children's punishment judgments were also primarily outcome-based. However, when this question was rephrased, 4-5-year-olds' judgments were approximately equally influenced by intention and outcome, and from 5-6 years they were based considerably more on intention than outcome. These findings indicate that, for methodological reasons, children's (and adults') ability to make intention-based judgment has often been substantially underestimated.
Introduction
Piaget (1932/1965) investigated whether children's moral judgments are based on intention or outcome by asking them about pairs of stories. In one of each pair a well-intentioned action accidentally resulted in a bad outcome, and in the other an ill-intentioned action led to a better outcome. He found that most children below about 10 years of age judged the well-intentioned agent to be the naughtier; in contrast to adults' intention-based evaluations, children judged actions and agents according to consequence.
Although subsequent research has established that children's moral judgments are not exclusively outcome-based, and that children are often aware of and sensitive to agents' intentions, many researchers have supported the claim that young children's moral judgments are primarily outcome-based (e.g., Buchanan & Thompson, 1973; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Elkind & Dabek, 1977; Farnill, 1974; Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Imamoglu, 1975; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Margoni & Surian, 2016; Walden, 1982; Yuill, 1984; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) . However, others have reported that even young children's moral judgments can be strongly influenced by intentions (e.g., Baird & Astington, 2004; Bearison & Isaacs, 1975; Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973; Gvozdic, Moutier, Dupoux, & Buon, 2016; Leon, 1982; Nelson, 1980; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009; Nummedal & Bass, 1976; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010) . Hamlin (2013) has recently reported that 8-month-olds prefer well-intentioned to successful agents (toys); that is, like adults, they prioritize intention over outcome. Hamlin suggests that her ''results are inconsistent with past research suggesting that young children focus mainly on outcomes (e.g., Piaget, 1932 Piaget, /1965 , and support the possibility that young children fail to privilege intention in their social and moral judgments [. . .] due to methodological difficulties, not psychological ones." (p. 460). This echoes Keasey's (1978) view that: ''the absence of intentionality [could be] merely an artefact of some feature of the assessment paradigm" (p. 237).
Despite the fundamental importance of intention-based moral judgment -Gray, Young, and Waytz (2012) describe our sensitivity to others' intentions and experiences as the very essence of human morality -there remains considerable disagreement between researchers about its development, and substantial discrepancies in findings. After decades of research, and scores of studies, it is still unclear whether the claim that children's moral judgment is primarily outcome-based is correct. The key issue now facing http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.019 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
